Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Counterpart theory: in the philosophy of David K. Lewis a counterpart is an object in a possible world, which corresponds to an object in our world - the actual world. For David Lewis no object is in more than one world. Therefore, he must accept counterparts. The counterparts may correspond exactly to the objects in our actual world or deviate more or less strongly from them. See also counterparts, counterpart relation, possible worlds, modal realism, actualism._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Robert Stalnaker on Counterpart Theory - Dictionary of Arguments
I 123 Counterpart Theory/Stalnaker: (different from Lewis): the actualistic version of the counterpart theory by Stalnaker has no equivalence relation and is non-transitive and non-symmetrical! Cf. >Counterpart theory/Lewis, >Counterpart relation/Lewis, >Actualism. Def Counterpart Relation/Stalnaker: (here) the counterpart relation is effective between a and b iff representatives a and b represent the same individual. >Representation/Stalnaker. I 125 The counterpart relation must be flexible - it cannot be transitive. The thing a could have two counterparts in another world. >Relations, >Transitivity._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
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> Counter arguments against Stalnaker
> Counter arguments in relation to Counterpart Theory
